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Abstract
This paper examines the formation of risk sharing networks in the rural Philippines. We
￿nd that geographic proximity ￿possibly correlated with kinship ￿is a major determinant of
mutual insurance links among villagers. Age and wealth di⁄erences also play an important
role. In contrast, income correlation and di⁄erences in occupation are not determinants of
network links. Reported network links have a strong e⁄ect on subsequent gifts and loans.
Gifts between network partners are found to respond to shocks and to di⁄erences in health
status. From this we conclude that intra-village mutual insurance links are largely deter-
mined by social and geographical proximity and are only weakly the result of purposeful
diversi￿cation of income risk. The paper also makes a methodological contribution to the
estimation of dyadic models.
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Much theoretical work has been done on networks by sociologists who have started thinking
about networks as early as the 1960￿ s (Mitchell 1969) and modeling them using graph theory
(e.g. Raub & Weesie 1990, Weesie & Raub 2000). More recently, networks have begun receiving
attention from economic theorists. Bala & Goyal (2000) and Goyal, van der Leij & Moraga-
Gonzalez (2004), for instance, have studied the relationship between network architecture and
underlying incentives. Kranton & Minehart (2001) have examined the restrictions on exchange
that network relationships place on exchange. Genicot & Ray (2003) and Bloch, Genicot &
Ray (2004) investigate the conditions under which speci￿c network architectures are stable with
respect to individual and group deviations. Recent progress has also been made ￿primarily by
epidemiologists or under their impetus ￿in the modeling of large networks (Vega-Redondo 2004).
Development economists have long suspected that interpersonal relationships help shape
economic exchange and agrarian institutions (e.g. Basu 1986, Bardhan 1984). This is probably
because formal institutions often are weak and must be supplemented by interpersonal trust
(Fafchamps 2005). This appears particularly true for risk sharing which, in addition to self-
insurance via precautionary saving, has been shown to be a fundamental risk coping mechanism
for the rural poor (e.g. Rosenzweig & Wolpin 1988, Townsend 1994, Ligon, Thomas & Worrall
2001, Ligon, Thomas & Worrall 2000, Fafchamps 2003). The pooling of idiosyncratic risk remains
primarily informal in much of the developing world (e.g. Fafchamps 1992, Coate & Ravallion
1993, Foster & Rosenzweig 2001). In addition to risk sharing within households (e.g. Rosenzweig
& Stark 1989, Dercon & Krishnan 2000), transfers and inter-personal loans constitute primary
channels of risk pooling (Udry 1994). Transfers and interpersonal loans have been shown to travel
primarily along long-lasting interpersonal networks (e.g. Ellsworth 1989, Lucas & Stark 1985).
The same is true of labor exchange arrangements (Krishnan & Sciubba 2004).
1In this paper we examine whether risk sharing networks are formed so as to maximize
the potential for income risk sharing. The bene￿t from sharing income risk is largest when
households have uncorrelated ￿or negatively correlated ￿incomes. Presumably this arises when
households have very di⁄erent income pro￿les ￿e.g., di⁄erent occupations ￿and are subjected
to di⁄erent sources of risk ￿ e.g., live far apart. Gains from risk sharing are thus expected
to increase with social and geographical distance. However, distance also raises the cost of
establishing and maintaining interpersonal links. The e⁄ect of distance on link formation is
therefore a priori indeterminate.
We investigate this issue empirically using survey data collected in rural Philippines for the
purpose of studying risk sharing. Fafchamps & Lund (2003) have shown that informal gifts
and loans serve a risk sharing purpose but also that the extent of risk sharing is limited by the
extent of interpersonal networks. Here we examine the factors determining the formation of
risk sharing networks and the extent to which these networks de facto shape subsequent gifts
and loans. We show that geographic proximity ￿possibly correlated with kinship ties ￿is a
major determinant of interpersonal networks. This may be because it facilitates monitoring and
enforcement and makes it easier to assist in case of health shock. Age and wealth di⁄erences
also play an important role in the formation of risk sharing links. In contrast, occupation and
income correlation are not major determinants of link formation. Reported network links have
a strong e⁄ect on subsequent gifts and loans. They also a⁄ect the way gifts and loans respond
to shocks, but the evidence is not statistically very strong. From this we conclude that gifts
and informal loans are embedded in interpersonal relationships. These relationships are largely
determined by proximity and are only weakly the result of purposeful diversi￿cation of income
risk.
This paper also makes a methodological contribution to the estimation of network regressions.
2We clarify the identi￿cation issues raised by dyadic regressions ￿that is, regressions in which
each observation expresses a relationship between pairs of nodes. We also extend the concept of
robust standard errors to dyadic regressions, thereby providing an easy alternative to network
inference methods based on permutations or generalized least squares.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 2 by presenting our regression model
and discussing various econometric issues raised by the estimation of dyadic regressions. In
Section 3 we present the data and its main characteristics. Econometric results are discussed in
detail in Section 4.
2. Econometric issues
We are interested in estimating a regression of the form:
Lij = 1 if B(dij;1) ￿ B(dij;0) ￿ C(dij) + eij > 0
= 0 otherwise (2.1)
where Lij denotes the existence of a link between individuals i and j and dij represents the
distance between i and j. The bene￿t from the link is denoted B(dij;Lij = 1)￿B(dij;Lij = 0),
the cost of maintaining a link is denoted C(dij), and eij is a residual e⁄ect. The bene￿t from
the link includes ￿but is not limited to ￿mutual insurance. A link is established if the bene￿t
from the link exceeds the cost of maintaining it.
We interpret distance as including multiple dimensions such as spatial distance, family relat-
edness, shared activities, age and gender. Because of moral hazard, information asymmetries,
and the ability to in￿ ict social sanctions, we expect C(dij) to increase with social and geograph-
ical distance. The potential for mutual insurance is also likely to increase with dij if shocks
3become less correlated the more di⁄erent individuals are. There is therefore a trade-o⁄ between
the scope for insurance and the ability to cross-insure. As a result, it is empirically unclear
whether individuals are able to establish mutual insurance links with people who are in the
best position to provide such insurance. Estimating equation (2.1) is the main objective of this
paper.
Equation (2.1) is a dyadic regression model. Dyadic regressions are de￿ned as having a
canonical form:
Yij = ￿ + ￿Xij + uij (2.2)
where i and j are individuals, Yij is an N ￿ (N ￿ 1) matrix, and Xij is a series of N ￿ (N ￿ 1)
matrices.1 Network analysis naturally leads to regression models of this form. The estimation
of dyadic regressions such as (2.2) raises two types of di¢ culties: identi￿cation, and inference.
The ￿rst problem relates to the form in which regressors Xij enter the regression. The second
relates to the estimation of standard errors. We discuss these in turn.
2.1. Identi￿cation
Dyadic data contains two types of information: attributes wij of the link between i and j,
such as the geographical distance between them, and attributes zi and zj of the nodes i and j.
Regressors must enter a dyadic regression in a symmetric fashion so that the e⁄ect of (zi;zj) on
Yij is the same as the e⁄ect of (zj;zi) on Yji. Dyadic regressions must therefore be written in
a way that preserves this symmetry. How this is accomplished depends on whether the dyadic
relationship is directional or not. Identi￿cation also depends on whether each individual i has
the same number of links ni ￿or degree. We discuss these two issues in turn.
A dyadic relationship is undirectional if Yji = Yij for all i;j. In this case, symmetry requires
1The total number of possible ij pairs is N
2, but we drop the N ii pairs on the diagonal.
4that regressors satisfy ￿Xij = ￿Xji. One easy way of satisfying this requirement is to specify
the regression as:
Yij = ￿ + ￿1jzi ￿ zjj + ￿2(zi + zj) + ￿jwijj + uij (2.3)
where zi and zj are characteristics of individual i and j thought to in￿ uence the likelihood of a
link Yij between them. In the case of continuous regressors, the (2.3) is intuitive: ￿1 measures
the e⁄ect of di⁄erences in attributes on Yij while ￿2 captures the e⁄ect of the combined level of
zi and zj on Yij. The same formalism can be applied to the case where zi is a dummy variable.2
If a dyadic relationship is directional, Yij need not equal Yji. In this case, an easy way to
satisfy the symmetry requirement is to specify the model as:
Yij = ￿ + ￿1(zi ￿ zj) + ￿2(zi + zj) + ￿wij + uij (2.4)
If zi is a dummy variable, the (2.4) formalism still yields the desired outcome.3
Identi￿cation depends on degree distribution. If all individuals have the same degree, we
cannot identify ￿2. This follows from the fact that dyadic observations are not independent.
Consequently the joint likelihood of the sample does not decompose into a product of single
observation likelihoods. When all individuals have the same degree, the structure of the joint
likelihood is such that only the e⁄ect of di⁄erences between observations can be identi￿ed.
Showing this formally is beyond the scope of this paper but to see this intuitively, imagine we
2To see that this formalism also applies to the case where zi is a dummy variable, note that in the undirectional
case there are three possible con￿gurations of (zi;zj): (0;0);(1;1); and f(1;0) or (0;1)g. One possible approach is
to create one dummy for the (1;1) con￿guration and another for the f(1;0) or (0;1)g con￿guration. An alternative
and equivalent approach is to apply the same transformation as for continous variables in (2.3): jzi ￿ zjj takes
two values, 0 if zi = zj and 1 otherwise, while zi + zj takes three possible values ￿0;1; and 2. The e⁄ect of a
(1;1) con￿guration is given by ￿2=2 gives while ￿1 + ￿2 gives the e⁄ect of a f(1;0) or (0;1)g con￿guration. The
advantage of applying the (2.3) formalism to all regressors will only become apparent when we introduce degree.
3There are now four possible con￿gurations: (zi;zj) = (0;0);(1;1);(1;0) or (0;1). At ￿rst glance it looks as if
we could introduce three separate dummy variables. Doing so would violate the symmetry requirement, however.
Indeed we need that the e⁄ect of (0;1) be the negative of the e⁄ect of (1;0). The (2.4) formalism ensures this
since zi ￿ zj can take three values: ￿1;0; and 1.
5have data on monogamous couples and that zi denotes education. By design, all individuals are
paired with one and only one other individual, irrespective of their education level. We can ask
the data whether educated people marry each other, but not whether educated people are more
likely to be married. This means that we can identify whether di⁄erences in attributes zi ￿ zj
a⁄ect the likelihood of a link, but not whether better educated people have on average more
links. It follows that the e⁄ect of zi + zj cannot be estimated: we can identify ￿1 but not ￿2.
Identi￿cation of ￿2 requires that individuals have di⁄erent degrees, as would be the case, for
instance, if the data included unmarried individuals or polygamous couples. Only then could
we ask the data whether educated people are more likely to be married. Degree variation is
necessary to identify level e⁄ects ￿2.
2.2. Standard errors
Dyadic observations are not independent. This is due to the presence of individual-speci￿c
factors common to all observations involving that individual. It is thus reasonable to assume
that E[uij;uik] 6= 0 for all k and E[uij;ukj] 6= 0 for all k. By the same reasoning, we also have
E[uij;ujk] 6= 0 and E[uij;uki] 6= 0.4 Provided that regressors are exogenous, applying OLS
to (2.3) and (2.4) yields consistent coe¢ cient estimates but standard errors are inconsistent,
leading to incorrect inference.
Robust standard errors must correct for cross-observation correlation in the error terms
involving similar individuals. To obtain such robust standard errors, we extend the method that
Conley (1999) developed to deal with spatial correlation of errors. Conley￿ s method is itself an
extension of the robust covariance matrix popularized by White and applied to time series by
4This situation bears some formal resemblance to random e⁄ects models with two-way error components
discussed for instance by Baltagi (1995), except that here we have four-way random e⁄ects.
6Newey and West. The formula for network corrected covariance matrix is of the form:
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where ￿ denotes the vector of coe¢ cients, N is the number of dyadic observations, K is the
number of regressors, X is the matrix of all regressors, Xij is the vector of regressors for dyadic
observation ij, and mijkl = 1 if i = k;j = l;i = l or j = k, and 0 otherwise.5 The only structure
imposed on the covariance structure is that E[uij;uik] 6= 0, E[uij;ukj] 6= 0; E[uij;ujk] 6= 0 and
E[uij;uki] 6= 0 for all k but that E[uij;ukm] = 0 otherwise.6 Formula (2.5) also corrects for
possible heteroskedasticity.
Monte Carlo simulations indicate that standard errors corrected for dyadic correlation can
be much larger than uncorrected ones. The bias is particularly large when the average degree
is high. Correcting standard errors is thus essential when estimating any dyadic regression. In
our case, the magnitude of the correction is relatively small because the average degree is low.
Other methods have been devised to conduct inference on network data. One such method
relies on permutation methods popularized by Good (2000). This method was ￿rst applied to
network analysis by Hubert & Schultz (1976) and subsequently re￿ned by Krackhardt (1987) and
Nyblom, Borgatti, Roslakka & Salo (2003). Instead of correcting standard errors, permutation
methods correct p-values directly. This procedure is known as Quadratic Assignment Procedure
or QAP in the literature (Hubert & Schultz 1976). This approach has gained much popularity
among sociologists who typically compute QAP p-values using a linear probability model. We
believe our method to be statistically more e¢ cient since it does not rely on bootstrapping. The
5By construction, all observations where j = i or k = l are identically zero and hence are omitted. Division of
the inner term by 2 corrects for the double counting implied by the simple way we have written the formula.
6Computation of (2.5) as written is very computer-intensive. It is however possible to take advantage of
speci￿c Stata commands and of the structure of the mijkl￿ s to reduce computation to a small number of matrix
manipulations. To apply formula (2.5) to logit, (X
0X)
￿1 needs to be replaced by an expression that depends on
the scores.
7￿rst version of this paper used QAP to derive p-values. Inference was similar to using dyadic
standard errors.7
3. The data
Having presented the conceptual framework and discussed econometric issues, we now describe
the data. Two types of sampling approaches have been used to collect network data. In the
two-step approach, the researcher samples a population at random, obtains information about
their network links, and surveys these links in a second step. This approach is particularly
interesting to study in-degree and network centrality ￿for instance, to identify people used as
source of ￿nance by many. The problem with this approach is that the second step nodes are
not selected randomly. This complicates inference.
In the one-step approach, a random sample of the population is selected and information is
collected on the links among them. Depending on time and resources, one may collect informa-
tion on all existing links, on the most important ones, or a random selection of them, as Conley
& Udry (2001) have done for instance. This approach o⁄ers the advantage that both nodes in
any link are randomly selected. This simpli￿es the econometric estimation of dyadic regressions.
Since in-degree and centrality are not the focus of our analysis, we use the one-step approach.
A survey was conducted in four villages in the Cordillera mountains of northern Philippines
between July, 1994 and March, 1995 (Lund 1996). A random sample of 206 rural household was
drawn after taking a census of all households in selected rural districts. These households are
dispersed over a wide area; most can only be reached by foot. Three interviews were conducted
with each household at three month intervals between July 1994, just after the annual rice
7A GLS estimator for dyadic data ￿called P2 ￿has also been developed by sociologists (Dekker, Krackhardt
& Snijders 2003). This method is sensitive to heteroskedasticity, which is why we prefer to keep OLS and logit
estimates and correct standard errors directly (Wooldridge 2002).
8harvest, and March 1995, after the new rice crop had been transplanted.
Sample households derive most of their income from non-farm activities (Fafchamps & Lund
2003). There are many skilled artisans in this area, and their wood carvings, woven blankets,
and rattan baskets supply a growing tourist and export trade. Unearned income ￿mostly land
rentals ￿is not negligible but very unevenly distributed across households, as is often the case
with asset income. Although nearly all households operate their own farm, the majority do not
produce enough grain to meet annual consumption needs. Sales of crops and livestock account
for a minute fraction of total income.
The data indicate that di⁄erences in income per capita across households are signi￿cantly
correlated with di⁄erences in wealth (￿ = 0:16; p-value= 0:000) and education levels (￿ = 0:19;
p-value= 0:000). They are also negatively correlated with di⁄erences in distance from the road.
This means that individuals located close to each other tend, on average, to have less similar
incomes. The e⁄ect is quite small, however (￿ = ￿0:05). We also ￿nd that households with
di⁄erent levels of education are less likely to be engaged in the same occupation.
At the beginning of the survey, each household was asked to identify a maximum of four
individuals on which it could rely in case of need or to whom the respondent gives help when
called upon to do so.8 These individuals constitute what we call the network of insurance
partners of each household. Approximately 939 network members are identi￿ed by the survey.
Of these, 189 or 20.1% are (members of) households already in the survey. In 68 of these
cases, both respondents cite each other as network partners. In the rest of the cases, only one
respondent cited the other household as part of their network. This is not too surprising given
the question that respondents were asked to answer: that A matters to B does not necessarily
8In practice, respondents listed on average 4.6 individuals, with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 8. This is
because in a number of cases respondents refused to rank individuals they regarded as equivalently close to them.
In such cases, enumerators were instructed to accommodate respondents rather than antagonize them.
9implies that B matters to A. Still, it serves as reminder that answers to the question do not
capture all the relationships that respondents are involved in. The network partners we have
identi￿ed probably constitute the nucleus of a larger, more di⁄use network which is di¢ cult
to quantify. The ￿rst panel of Table 1 shows that most insurance partners are close family
members, e.g., children or siblings. The second panel of the table indicates that most of them
(63.3%) reside in the same village (barangay).
In the analysis presented here, we focus on the link between sample households, which are
all residents of the four studied villages. As indicated by Table 1, surveyed households also
have links with individuals outside the study area, such as migrants in distant cities or traders
in nearby towns. It is quite conceivable that these individuals play an important role in risk
sharing, as pointed out, for instance, by Rosenzweig & Stark (1989) or Lucas & Stark (1985).
Our analysis should thus be viewed as a study of network formation among villagers. This is a
valid focus, given the assumption often made in the literature that villagers pool idiosyncratic
risk. But it is a limitation of our approach that should be kept in mind.
Information was also collected on all debts and gifts. Respondents were asked to list all
loans and transfers taking place within the last three months of each survey round. Great care
was taken to collect data on all possible in-kind payments and transfers, including crops, meals,
and labor services. The identity of the partner was recorded for each transaction, whether the
person was identi￿ed as a ￿ linked￿individual or not. Using these data Fafchamps & Lund (2003)
have shown that gifts and loans serve in part to deal with income and health shocks and that
shocks to network partners a⁄ect households￿ability to borrow or receive gifts. Building on the
work of Udry (1994), Fafchamps & Gubert (2002) have further shown that the repayment of
loans between friends and neighbors is contingent on shocks, further con￿rming the insurance
role of gifts and loans in the study area.
104. Empirical estimation
We now turn to the estimation of equation (2.1). We proceed in two steps. First we estimate
a reduced form in which we control for geographical distance wij and various factors zi and
zj thought to in￿ uence the level, variance, and covariance of income. Secondly we estimate a
structural model of link formation in which the level, variance, and covariance of income are
instrumented using the zi￿ s as regressors. We begin with the ￿rst set of results.
4.1. The determinants of network formation
For our reduced form analysis, we regress Lij on various measures of social and geographical
distance.9 Descriptive statistics for variables used in the paper are presented in Table 2. The
dependent variable Lij is equal to 1 if household i cited household j as source of assistance, and
0 otherwise. Since i can cite j without j citing i, Lij is directional.
Let us start by saying that we do not have information on kinship or relatedness for all
household pairs in the sample. We only have that information for linked pairs. The reason
is that collecting such data is extremely time-consuming since each household has to be asked
about its family relationship with each of the other 205 households in the survey. We feared
losing many respondents by including such a cumbersome module in the survey.10 This means
that we cannot formally investigate whether blood or marriage ties are a strong link determinant,
9It is conceivable that households form links with someone only to link up, through that person, with somebody
else. A proper treatment of this issue goes well beyond the scope of this paper because it involves modeling complex
strategic interactions between households (e.g. Genicot & Ray 2003, Bloch, Genicot & Ray 2004). Even in such
an environment, however, it is possible to ask whether there are individual characteristics that help predict link
formation.
Fafchamps and Lund discuss the issue of ￿ friction￿in the risk sharing network. They point out that if transfers
circulate costlessly through the network, the network architecture does not matter. Their evidence indicates that
the architecture does matter, suggesting the presence of friction. In that case, linking up to someone through a
proxy is less e⁄ective than linking up with the person directly. When asked to state the reason for taking a loan,
some respondents state that the money is meant to help someone else, but these cases are rare.
10More e¢ cient techniques for eliciting kinship information have now be devised. Recently de Weerdt (2002),
for instance, managed to collect such information for all 120 households in a Tanzanian village. This issue deserves
more research.
11as we suspect.11 To the extent that relatives reside near each other, as seems to be the case in
the study area, geographical proximity captures some of the e⁄ects of kinship.
Geographical distance is measured by two variables. The ￿rst one is a dummy variable
taking value 1 if both households i and j reside in the same sitio, a small cluster of 15 to 30
households. The anthropological literature describes sitios as traditional community groups
composed mainly of kin.12 Living in the same sitio is thus related to kinship. The second
variable captures the di⁄erence between i￿ s and j￿ s distance to the nearest road, provided they
reside in the same sitio. Presumably, if households in the same sitio are at the same distance
from the nearest road, they are close geographically.13 In addition to its correlation with kinship,
geographical proximity is also expected to help alleviate monitoring and enforcement di¢ culties
￿and hence to lower the cost of maintaining a link. To the extent that incomes are spatially
correlated, it also reduces expected gains for income pooling. But it opens more opportunities
for helping each other in case of health shocks: proximity makes it easier to provide home care,
to comfort the bereaved, and to assist with visits to health facilities.
We focus on six dimensions of social distance: occupation, household size, age, health,
education, and wealth. We expect bene￿ts from the pooling of income risk to be largest between
people with di⁄erent occupations ￿and especially high between farmers and non-farm workers.
Farming risk is primarily determined by weather conditions and pest infestation. Non-farm
11It would also have been interesting to contrast male and female networks. Because nearly all respondents are
male household heads, our data does not allow an investigation of this issue.
12E.g., http://countrystudies.us/philippines/42.htm: ￿In the rural Philippines, traditional values remained the
rule. The family was central to a Filipino￿ s identity, and many sitios were composed mainly of kin. Kin ties
formed the basis for most friendships and supranuclear family relationships. Filipinos continued to feel a strong
obligation to help their neighbors￿whether in granting a small loan or providing jobs for neighborhood children,
or expecting to be included in neighborhood work projects, such as rebuilding or reroo￿ng a house and clearing
new land. The recipient of the help was expected to provide tools and food. Membership in the cooperative work
group sometimes continued even after a member left the neighborhood. Likewise, the recipient￿ s siblings joined
the group even if they lived outside the sitio. In this way, familial and residential ties were intermixed.￿
13This is of course a noisy measure since, in sitios located very close to the road, it is possible for two people
to be far apart and yet to be the same distance to the road. But in such sitios distance to the road is short for
everyone, so distance di⁄erences are close to zero. This is less of an issue for sitios located away from the road.
On average surveyed households are located 17.5 minutes of walking distance from the nearest road.
12income risk is largely in￿ uenced by demand for crafts by traders and tourists visiting the area.
Consequently we expect both sources of risk to be uncorrelated with each other. The data indeed
show a very low ￿and non-signi￿cant ￿0.06 correlation between farm and non-farm income. If
farming and non-farm incomes have a large collective risk component, pooling income within each
occupation should be fairly ine⁄ective at reducing risk. To the extent that network formation is
driven by the desire to maximize gains from income pooling, links should be formed primarily
between people with di⁄erent occupations.
The simplest measure of occupation we use in our analysis is a dummy variable that takes
value 1 if the main occupation of the household head is agriculture, and 0 otherwise. This
variable captures the main occupational divide in the study area. We also experiment with a
￿ner breakdown of occupation that combines information on primary and secondary activities
of all household members. The number of working members in the household is also included
as regressor because household with more income earners can be more diversi￿ed and hence less
dependent on outside assistance (e.g. Binswanger & McIntire 1987, Fafchamps 2003).14 We do
not control for household size per se in order to abstract from child fostering, which has been
documented to play a risk sharing role (e.g. Evans 2004, Akresh 2004).
As pointed out earlier, income pooling is not the only form that risk sharing can take. Taking
care of the sick and elderly is another. Health status is captured by an index variable that takes
value 1 if the household head is in good health, 2 if the head is often ill, 3 if he or she is chronically
ill, and 4 if he or she is disabled. Presumably individuals with worse health need more assistance
but are also less able to reciprocate. Di⁄erences in terms of age also raise the potential for risk
pooling: presumably, young households with many children face di⁄erent health risks from the
14In the analysis presented here we take the number of working adults in the household as given. Given the
short-term nature of our analysis (a total duration of 9 months), this is a reasonable approximation. Over a longer
time horizon, Frankenberg, Smith & Thomas (2003) have shown that households adjust their size in response to
large macro shocks.
13elderly. Di⁄erences in age are also likely to be associated with di⁄erences in lifestyle, perhaps
reducing social interaction across groups. Again, if bene￿ts from pooling risk across categories
outweigh the cost of linking up, we expect more links between di⁄erent age groups.
The remaining measures of social distance are education and wealth. Households with better
education and more wealth probably have higher incomes as well. To the extent that absolute
risk aversion is decreasing with income, as is customarily assumed, households with high average
income are in a good position to o⁄er income insurance to poorer households (Fafchamps 1999).
Risk sharing may also have a redistribution component and the rich may be expected to help the
poor, irrespective of risk sharing. For these two reasons, establishing links with richer and better
educated households is attractive to poor households.15 Rich households, in contrast, would see
less need for links with poor households ￿or may not even see them as source of insurance.
Because insurance a⁄ects income and thus the ability to accumulate assets, wealth is po-
tentially endogenous to the network formation process: households with better networks may
accumulate more wealth. For this reason we instrument individual wealth using variables that
predate the purposive formation of insurance links, namely: the education of head; the value
of the inheritance of the head and spouse; whether the head was born in the village of current
residence; whether the household head is male; and the number of siblings of the head and
spouse. All instrumenting regression results are presented in Appendix. Since wealth enters
dyadic regressions in di⁄erence and sum, we estimate two instrumenting regressions, which are
presented in Table A1 together with t-values based on the dyadic standard errors obtained from
15Education is also as a possible source of insurance. In poor societies such as the one we study, knowledge is
valuable, particularly regarding contacts with the outside world (e.g., government authorities, cooperative bank,
health facilities, traders, extension agents). To rural dwellers, educated households may thus be seen as providing
some protection against abuse in dealings with the outside world. Educated households may also be less vulnerable
(Glewwe & Hall 1998) and recover more easily from collective shocks (Barrett, Sherlund & Adesina 2004). For
this reason, we expect gains from risk sharing to be higher between households with di⁄erent education levels.
However, di⁄erences in education level may also increase social distance and make socialization more di¢ cult
(Mogues & Carter 2005).
14(2.5). Given that they are estimated from the same data, their coe¢ cients are very similar. We
see that instruments have a strong predictive power, particularly inherited wealth. Predicted
wealth variables from these regressions are used in lieu of actual wealth in all the analysis that
follows.
Our ￿rst set of regression results is presented in Table 3. By construction, geographical
distance variables are undirectional; as they are link attributes, they enter the regression as
such. In contrast, each individual attribute is used to construct two regressors of the form
zi ￿ zj and zi + zj. Since the dependent variable Lij is directional, regressors zi ￿ zj enters the
regression as such, not in absolute value.
As explained in the econometrics section, we can only estimate the coe¢ cient of zi + zj
regressors if individuals have di⁄erent degree. Although the number of network links varies a
bit across respondents,16 it is important to realize is that the survey did not seek to measure
the number of links of each respondent. We thus do not have a strong basis for identifying level
e⁄ects zi+zj. Although the degree variation present in the sample makes identi￿cation possible
in practice, the resulting estimates may not be reliable. For this reason, we estimate our model
with and without level e⁄ects.
As explained earlier, the data come from four villages or barangay. We found no link between
households across village boundaries: being in di⁄erent villages perfectly predicts the absence
of a link. There is therefore no point in including pairs of individuals from di⁄erent villages in
the estimation. For this reason, we only include pairs that come from the same barangay. This
explains why the reported number of observations is less than N2 ￿ N = 42230.17
16This variation is due to three sources. First, some respondents could not give four names. Second, some
respondents refused to limit their response to four. Third, even for those households who listed four links, degree
variation arises when we restrict the attention to network partners who are themselves in the sample.
17The dyadic standard error formula is adjusted to take this into account. This is accomplished by computing
(2.5) for each village separately, summing over the four villages, and dividing by the total number of observations.
15The ￿rst column of Table 3 presents our ￿rst set of logit estimates without level e⁄ects.18 Ro-
bust dyadic standard errors are reported throughout. Village (barangay) dummies are included
to control for possible village e⁄ects. Geographical e⁄ects appear strongly signi￿cant: respon-
dents are much more likely to cite as a mutual insurance link someone residing in the same sitio.
Conditional on living in the same sitio, respondents are also more likely to cite someone close to
them within the sitio. Geographical proximity is unambiguously a strong predictor of network
links. As we pointed out earlier, spatial proximity reduces the scope for pooling agronomic risk
(pests, ￿ oods, landslides) but it facilitates monitoring and enforcement, especially given the fact
that it is correlated with kinship. It also makes it easier to look after a sick neighbor and thus
enhances the scope for pooling health risk.
The age di⁄erence variable is signi￿cant: younger heads of household are more likely to
mention a link with an older household. This is consistent with the pooling of health risk,
although it could also result from life cycle e⁄ects or intergenerational altruism. Wealth is also
signi￿cant: consistent with expectations, households are more likely to mention as source of
insurance households that are richer than themselves.
Contrary to expectations, education, occupation, and the number of working adults are not
signi￿cant. The big surprise is that occupation is not signi￿cant: households primarily involved
in farming activities are not more likely to be linked with non-farmers. Surveyed households
do not appear to form the mutual insurance links with other villagers that would maximize
the gains from pooling idiosyncratic income risk. Intra-village links thus appear di⁄erent from
inter-region links, such as links with distant migrants, which have been documented to serve an
income diversi￿cation function (e.g. Lucas & Stark 1985, Rosenzweig & Stark 1989, Lauby &
18The reader may worry that logit may not be appropriate in this case given the very small proportion of
non-zero values of the dependent variable. To investigate whether this is a cause for concern, we reestimated the
model using an extreme value distribution instead of a logistic distribution. Virtually identical results obtain.
16Stark 1988).
To check the robustness of our results, we add level e⁄ects and reestimate the model. As
emphasized earlier, the coe¢ cients of level e⁄ects may not be estimated reliably in our data, so
we will not discuss their interpretation in much detail. Regression results are presented in the
second column of Table 3. Our ￿ndings are unchanged. The only signi￿cant zi + zj variable
is the number of working adults in the household: links are less likely to be reported between
households with many working age adults. This is consistent with the view that large households
themselves serve to pool risk, thereby reducing the need for networking (e.g. Binswanger &
Rosenzweig 1986, Binswanger & McIntire 1987, Fafchamps 2003).
Another possible source of concern is that households may locate close to other households
with whom they wish to pool income risk. This could explain why spatial proximity is strongly
signi￿cant while occupation and education are not. To investigate this possibility, we reestimate
the model with only the households whose heads are residing in the village of their birth. We
correct for self-selection using a probit selection equation shown in Table A2 in Appendix. The
dependent variable is 1 if the heads of both households i and j are living in the village of their
birth, 0 otherwise. Birth order is used as instrument. Education, age and gender are also
included as pre-determined regressors. Given the local culture (Quisumbing 1994), we expect
￿rst-borns to remain close to their parents, and thus to live in the village of their birth. Results
indicate that birth order is a signi￿cant predictor of residence in birth village. Education is also
signi￿cant, with the expected sign: educated individuals are more likely to move out of rural
areas, at least for a while.
Results from the selection equation are used to construct a Mills ratio for each pair of
respondents i and j. This Mills ratio is then included in the dyadic regression as additional
regressor. Regression results are shown in the last column of Table 3. Although the number of
17observations is much smaller, results are basically unchanged except that they are slightly less
signi￿cant. The Mills ratio is far from signi￿cant, suggesting that self-selection is not a source
of concern. These ￿ndings suggest that our results are not the consequence of endogenous
household placement.
Next we investigate whether the non-signi￿cant result for occupation is due to mis-speci￿cation.
To this e⁄ect, we replace the farmer dummy with a more detailed description of the activities
undertaken by all members of the household. Regression results are shown in Table 4, with and
without level e⁄ects. We see that identical results obtain: wealth, age, and the geographical
variables remain basically unchanged in magnitude and signi￿cance while none of the occupation
variables is even remotely signi￿cant.
4.2. Network formation and insurance
The analysis so far has found no evidence that surveyed households form risk sharing links
primarily with other villagers with whom gains from income risk pooling would be maximized.
This may be because the reduced form approach obscures the income pooling motive. To
investigate this possibility, we estimate an alternative model in which we control directly for the
correlation in the income of i and j. If respondents form links with people who have an income
less correlated with theirs, the coe¢ cient of income correlation in (2.1) should be negative. This
is the basis for our testing strategy.
We begin by constructing a measure of income yt
i for each household in each of the three
survey rounds. The income variable includes earnings from jobs held in the last three months
(e.g., casual labour, woodcarving, basket making, blanket weaving), unearned incomes received
in the last three months (e.g., rents, pensions), and earnings from the sale of crops and livestock
in the last three months. The latter component of income is minimal in the studied area. The
18imputed value of own agricultural production is not included in the computation of the income
aggregate since it does not change over the duration of the survey and hence does not contribute
to income correlation measured over the three rounds. It is important to keep in mind that,
given data constraints, variable yt
i does not include year-to-year variation in agricultural income.
But yt
i measures short-term ￿ uctuations in non-farm income. Given that non-farm income is a
dominant source of livelihood in the study area, yt
i is still a useful variable to look at: households
have to smooth consumption over time, and mutual insurance links with other villagers may
help them do that.
Using yt
i, we compute the correlation ￿ij of income between all ij pairs. Needless to say,
since ￿ij is computed using only three periods, it is estimated with much measurement error. To
correct for this, we instrument ￿ij using all the regressors appearing in the last column of Table 4.
Since ￿ij is undirectional, di⁄erence regressors all appears in absolute value. Results are shown
in the ￿rst column of Table A3 in Appendix. As anticipated, households with more working
members have less correlated incomes. But contrary to expectations we ￿nd that incomes are
more correlated between households with a di⁄erent level of education and with a di⁄erent
number of members involved in farming or other self-employment activities. Other coe¢ cients
are non signi￿cant and the predictive power of the regression is quite low (R2 = 0:03).
We reestimate equation (2.1) with predicted income correlation as additional regressor.19
Results are presented in the ￿rst column on Table 4. We see that b ￿ij has a positive sign, but
is not signi￿cant.20 Other results are unchanged. This ￿nding constitutes additional evidence
that links are not formed preferentially with individuals who have a less correlated income.
This result could be because we have omitted the expectation and standard deviation of
19To be more precise, we follow Smith & Blundell (1986) and include the residuals from the instrumenting
equation as additional regressors. Although this technique has only been proven valid for probit regressions, by
analogy it should also work better in logit.
20If we use the covariance of income instead of the correlation, results are similarly non-signi￿cant.
19income from the regression. Indeed, in a general model of risk sharing, the mean and variation
of income also a⁄ect the utility gain from risk sharing and hence possibly the matching process.
To investigate this, we construct the mean ￿i and standard deviation ￿i of yt
i from individual
round-level data and instrument them using the same regressors. Instrumenting regressions
are presented in last four columns of Table A3 in Appendix. To keep in line with the form of
equation (2.1), we separately instrument the sums ￿i+￿j and ￿i+￿j and di⁄erences ￿i￿￿j and
￿i ￿ ￿j, but this is not necessary.21 Results show that, as anticipated, wealth and the number
of working adults are strong predictors of income and that, in the study area, wage earners
have lower incomes on average. This probably re￿ ects that nature of wage employment among
villagers in the study area. As anticipated, we ￿nd that households with more income earners
have a less variable total household income while households in which the head is in poor health
have less variable income ￿probably because income is lower.
We then enter the predicted residuals from the sums and di⁄erences regressions as additional
regressors in equation (2.1). Results are presented in the second column of Table 5. Income
covariance remains positive and non-signi￿cant. Contrary to expectations, the likelihood of a link
is seen to decrease with the (sum of) the standard deviation of income: presumably, households
with more risk income would be more keen to form mutual insurance links. We also see that
links are less likely between households with di⁄erent levels of income variation. These ￿ndings
are again inconsistent with a mutual insurance motive for link formation: if villagers form links
to pool income risk, other things being equal individuals with more variable income would seek
to link up with individuals whose income is less variable. We also estimated equation (2.1) using
uninstrumented correlation, mean, and standard deviation of income. Income correlation results
21In the sum regressions, only sums of regressors enter while in the di⁄erence regressions only di⁄erence re-
gressors enter. Results are nevertheless very similar, as expected. Virtually identical results obtain if we ￿rst
instrument ￿i and ￿i, obtain the predicted values, and then take the sum and di⁄erence of the predicted values
to construct the necessary regressors.
20remain unchanged.
It is conceivable that we have failed to ￿nd evidence of risk sharing because we have looked
at the wrong risk measure. To investigate this possibility, we broaden our de￿nition of risk
to include other types of shocks. The survey collected information on a variety of income and
consumption shocks, such as crop failure, unemployment, sickness, and funerals. Moreover,
respondents were asked to provide a summary assessment of their ￿nancial situation in each
survey round. Responses range from -2 for very good to +2 for very bad. Because this assessment
may be endogenous to network formation, it is instrumented using objective shock measures,
village-time dummies, and household ￿xed e⁄ects as instruments. We then reestimate equation
(2.1) as in Table 5, replacing income correlation with covariance in summary assessments. The
regressor of interest is the (instrumented) covariance of the summary assessment variable: if its
coe¢ cient is negative, this constitutes evidence that villagers form links to share risk. Results,
not shown here to save space, instead yield a signi￿cant positive e⁄ect of the covariance of link
formation. Put di⁄erently, villagers who are linked have a higher level of covariance between
their summary assessments. This is again inconsistent with the idea that links are formed to
maximizes the potential for risk sharing.
4.3. The role of network links
Could it be our conclusions are erroneous because we have been looking at the wrong measure?
What if reported links were irrelevant but mutual assistance did take place in a way that is con-
sistent with the maximization of gains from risk sharing? To see how this situation could arise,
imagine that strong bonds exist between most villagers. When faced with a shock, households
simply go to the person most able to assist them. Asked by enumerators to provide four names,
respondents may have listed the ￿rst people that came to mind, such as immediate neighbors.
21But these people need not play a practical role in sharing risk because the actual network is
much larger.
To show that our results are not driven by such underlying process, we need to test two
hypotheses: ￿rst, that ex post risk sharing follow a pattern similar to those of reported links;
and secondly that reported links are not irrelevant, that they play a role in the sharing of risk. To
investigate the ￿rst hypothesis, we examine all gifts and loans received by respondent households
in rounds 2 and 3 of the survey. Fafchamps & Lund (2003) have shown that, in the study area,
gifts and loans play an important risk management function. We drop gifts and loans received
in round 1 to avoid the spurious correlation that could arise if people interviewed in round 1
listed as network links individuals who have helped them in the recent past.
We begin by noting that a little under half of all gifts and loans come from linked individuals.
This shows that linked individuals are not the only possible source of help, suggesting that the
actual network is indeed larger than the reported network. But the proportion of gifts and loans
coming from linked individuals is nevertheless much larger than their share of the total number
of possible pairs, suggesting that reported links are not irrelevant. To investigate this formally,
we estimate a model of the form:
Gt
ij = ￿ + ￿0(zi ￿ zj)L
t1
ij + ￿1(zi ￿ zj) + ￿2(zi + zj) + ￿wij + uij (4.1)
where Gt
ij denotes the value of all gifts (or loans) received by i from j in round t = t2 and
t3.22 Variables zi and wij are as in Table 3. We also include village-time dummies to control for
shocks that are common to all villagers. The interaction terms (zi ￿ zj)L
t1
ij are included to test
22To minimize recall bias, we construct G
t
ij by including gifts (and loans) reported as received from j by i as
well as gifts (and loans) reported as given by j to i. When i and j report something di⁄erent, we keep the largest
value of the two. To reduce the weight of outliers while avoiding losing all 0 observations, we take as dependent
variable the log of (1+G
t
ij).
22whether reported links are irrelevant. If wealth di⁄erences are found to explain gifts received,
this can be taken as evidence that gifts serve a redistribution purpose.
Results for gifts are shown in Table 6. Geographical proximity variables are strongly sig-
ni￿cant in both the gift and loan regressions, con￿rming earlier results. We ￿nd no evidence
that gifts ￿ ow more between individuals with di⁄erent occupation, ruling out the idea that re-
spondents make a deliberate e⁄ort to share risk across occupations. Wealth di⁄erences are also
non-signi￿cant, indicating that on average gifts do not serve a redistributive purpose. But we
￿nd that individuals who are less healthy ￿i.e., have a higher health index ￿are more likely
to receive gifts. We also see that the existence of a reported link triggers gifts to unhealthy
individuals that are 200 times larger ￿suggesting that these links are not irrelevant after all.
Results for loans, which are presented in the second column of Table 6, show that occupation
does matter: farmers are less likely to receive loans from non-farmers ￿or alternatively non-
farmers are more likely to receive loans from farmers. This e⁄ect is magni￿ed 27 times if a link
was reported between the two individuals. These results again con￿rm that reported links are not
irrelevant. They also show that informal loans are a⁄ected by occupational complementarities.
We also need to show that reported links do serve a risk sharing purpose. To investigate
this, we estimate a model of the form:
Gt
ij = ￿ + ￿1(St
i ￿ St
j) + ￿2(St
i ￿ St
j)L
t0
ij + ￿3L
t0
ij + ￿1(zi ￿ zj) + ￿wij + uij (4.2)
where Gij as before denotes gifts (or loans) given by j to i, , and St
i and St
j measure shocks
that individuals i and j at time t = t2 and t3. If gifts or loans serve a risk sharing purpose with
villagers at large, we should observe gifts from people experiencing a good shock (low value of
S) to people experiencing a bad shock (high value of S) ￿and hence ￿1 > 0. If gifts and loans
serve a risk sharing purpose only with reported link individuals, then we should observe ￿1 = 0
23and ￿2 > 0. Because a link may favor gifts for purposes other than risk sharing, we control for
L
t0
ij separately to avoid spurious results.
Our shock measure St
i is taken from responses to a subjective assessment question. Respon-
dents were asked in each round to rank their situation relative other the recent past. Responses
range from -2 for very good to +2 for very bad. Based on subjective assessment, this variable is
of course subject to measurement error. To correct for this, we instrument it using responses to
objective risk factors, such as as whether any member of the household experienced an acute or
mild illness in the three months preceding the interview, whether any member of the household
became unemployed, and whether the household was obligated to incur a large ritual expense
(such as a funeral). The instrumenting regression is shown in Table A4 in Appendix. We see
that all four objective shock variables have the anticipated sign and are strongly signi￿cant. We
then use the predicted value b St
i from this regression in lieu of St
i in equation (4.2).23
Results are presented in Table 7 for gifts and loans. We see that ￿1 is not signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from 0 in both regressions but ￿2 is positive and is signi￿cant at the 10% level in the
gift equation. While the result is not very strong, it nevertheless provides some support to
the idea that reported links do serve a risk sharing purpose. We ￿nd that reported links are a
strong predictor of gifts and loans received, irrespective of shocks. Reported links are thus not
irrelevant, they do capture an important dimension of social interactions among villagers. We
also estimated equation (4.2) with individual shock variables, but results are not generally not
signi￿cant. This is probably because we do not have enough pairs with non-zero gifts and loans,
making identi￿cation di¢ cult. We do however ￿nd that acute sickness is nearly signi￿cant at
the 10% level in the gift regression (t value of 1.64).
23When we use the actual value S
t
i, results are non-signi￿cant. This is consistent with the atenuation biased
caused by measurement error.
245. Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the determinants of risk sharing links among households. It
is indeed increasingly recognized that informal risk sharing plays a major role in the way the
rural poor deal with risk (e.g. Rosenzweig & Wolpin 1988, Townsend 1994, Ligon, Thomas &
Worrall 2001) and that interpersonal networks facilitate informal risk sharing (e.g. Fafchamps
1992, Dercon & de Weerdt 2002, Fafchamps & Lund 2003, Dercon & Krishnan 2000).
Theory predicts that social and geographic distance between households raises the potential
bene￿ts from risk pooling but also the cost of establishing and maintaining interpersonal links.
The e⁄ect of distance on link formation is therefore theoretically indeterminate. If costs rise
su¢ ciently rapidly with distance, the pooling of risk across households with di⁄erent income
pro￿les will not be achieved. The e¢ ciency of informal risk pooling thus depends on the way
risk sharing networks are formed.
We investigated this issue empirically using a speci￿cally designed survey in rural Philip-
pines. We examined which dimensions of social and geographical distance predict the existence
of risk sharing relationships. We found that geographic proximity is a major determinant of in-
terpersonal relationships, possibly because it captures kith and kin relationships and facilitates
monitoring and enforcement. Age and wealth di⁄erences also play an important role in the
formation of risk sharing links. In contrast, occupation is not a determinant of network links.
Neither is income correlation. We also ￿nd that reported network links have a strong e⁄ect on
subsequent gifts and loans. Gifts in kind and in cash between network partners are found to
respond to shocks, but the evidence is not statistically very strong.
These ￿ndings suggest that surveyed households do not form links that maximize potential
gains from sharing income risk. Why this is the case is unclear, but the body of the evidence
presented here suggests that link maintenance costs ￿proxied by geographical distance ￿prevent
25households from forming links that would be optimal from the point of view of income risk
sharing. However, we should stress that links with individuals outside the four surveyed villages
are not included in the analysis presented here. We suspect that these links are much more
important for income smoothing than intra-village links.
The strongest evidence of intra-village risk sharing relates to health risk. Households in which
the head is a› icted by health problems receive more gifts from other villagers, especially from
network partners, and households in which one member su⁄ered an acute illness receive more
gifts from network partners as well, albeit the e⁄ect in only marginally signi￿cant. Combined
with the fact that age di⁄erences are an important determinant of village network link, this
constitutes impressionistic evidence that mutual insurance networks between villagers may be
formed more with health risk than income risk in mind ￿see Dercon & de Weerdt (2002) for a
similar point. This issue deserves more research.
The literature has shown that income risk is not e¢ ciently pooled in village economies
(e.g. Townsend 1994, Ligon, Thomas & Worrall 2001, Foster & Rosenzweig 2001, Fafchamps
& Lund 2003). This paper suggests that households do not appear to purposefully form links
with villagers who have a di⁄erent income pro￿le. In these conditions, it is hardly surprising
that e¢ cient income risk sharing has consistently been rejected among the rural poor. Having
uncovered one of the reasons why e¢ ciency is not achieved, the challenge is now to ￿nd ways of
encouraging risk pooling across occupations and income pro￿les.
This paper also makes a methodological contribution to the burgeoning empirical literature
on economic networks (e.g. Krishnan & Sciubba 2004, Goyal, van der Leij & Moraga-Gonzalez
2004, Fafchamps, Goyal & van der Leij 2005). First we clari￿ed identi￿cation issues in dyadic
data, especially with respect to directed networks and degree distribution. Second we facilitated
inference on network processes by applying the well-known concept of robust standard errors to
26dyadic data. These methodological improvements should assist other researchers working with
dyadic data in general, and with network data in particular.
References
Akresh, Richard. 2004. ￿Risk, Network Quality, and Family Structure: Child Fostering Decisions
in Burkina Faso.￿(mimeograph).
Bala, Venkatesh & Sanjeev Goyal. 2000. ￿A Non-Cooperative Model of Network Formation.￿
Econometrica 68(5):1181￿ 1229.
Baltagi, Badi H. 1995. Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. Chichester: Wiley.
Bandiera, Oriana & Imran Rasul. 2002. Social Networks and Technology Adoption in Northern
Mozambique. Technical report CEPR London: . Discussion Paper 3341.
Bardhan, Pranab. 1984. Land, Labor and Rural Poverty. New York: Columbia U.P.
Barr, Abigail. 2000. ￿Social Capital and Technical Information Flows in the Ghanaian Manu-
facturing Sector.￿Oxford Economic Papers 52(3):539￿ 59.
Barrett, Christopher B., Shane M. Sherlund & Akinwumi A. Adesina. 2004. ￿Macroeconomic
Shocks, Human Capital and Productive E¢ ciency: Evidence from West African Rice Farm-
ers.￿(mimeograph).
Barton, Roy F. 1969. Ifugao Law. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2nd edition.
Basu, Kaushik. 1986. ￿One Kind of Power.￿Oxford Econ. Papers 38:259￿ 282.
Bernstein, Lisa. 1992. ￿Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry.￿Journal of Legal Studies XXI:115￿ 157.
27Bernstein, Lisa. 1996. ￿Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code￿ s Search for
Immanent Business Norms.￿University of Pennsylvania Law Review 144(5):1765￿ 1821.
Binswanger, Hans P. & John McIntire. 1987. ￿Behavioral and Material Determinants of Produc-
tion Relations in Land-Abundant Tropical Agriculture.￿Econ. Dev. Cult. Change 36(1):73￿
99.
Binswanger, Hans P. & Mark R. Rosenzweig. 1986. ￿Behavioral and Material Determinants of
Production Relations in Agriculture.￿Journal of Development Studies 22, no. 3:503￿ 539.
Bloch, F., Garance Genicot & Debraj Ray. 2004. ￿Social Networks and Informal Insurance.￿
(mimeograph).
Coate, Stephen & Martin Ravallion. 1993. ￿Reciprocity Without Commitment: Characterization
and Performance of Informal Insurance Arrangements.￿J. Dev. Econ. 40:1￿ 24.
Conklin, Harold. 1980. Ethnographic Atlas of Ifugao: A Study of Environment, Culture and
Society in Northern Luzon. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Conley, T.G. 1999. ￿GMM Estimation with Cross-Sectional Dependence.￿Journal of Econo-
metrics 92(1):1￿ 45.
Conley, Timothy & Christopher Udry. 2001. ￿Social Learning through Networks: The Adoption
of New Agricultural Technologies in Ghana.￿American Journal of Agricultural Economics
83(3):668￿ 73.
Dekker, David, David Krackhardt & Tom Snijders. 2003. ￿Multicollinearity Robust QAP for
Multiple-Regression.￿(mimeograph).
28Dercon, Stefan & Joachim de Weerdt. 2002. Risk-Sharing Networks and Insurance Against Ill-
ness. Technical report CSAE Working Paper Series No. 2002-16, Department of Economics,
Oxford University Oxford: .
Dercon, Stefan & Pramila Krishnan. 2000. ￿In Sickness and in Health: Risk-Sharing within
Households in Rural Ethiopia.￿Journal of Political Economy 108(4):688￿ 727.
de Weerdt, Joachim. 2002. Risk-Sharing and Endogenous Network Formation. Technical report
WIDER Discussion Paper No. 2002-57 Helsinki: .
Ellsworth, Lynn. 1989. Mutual Insurance and Non-Market Transactions Among Farmers in
Burkina Faso. University of Wisconsin. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis.
Evans, David. 2004. ￿The Spillover Impacts of Africa￿ s Orphan Crisis.￿(mimeograph).
Fafchamps, Marcel. 1992. ￿Solidarity Networks in Pre-Industrial Societies: Rational Peasants
with a Moral Economy.￿Econ. Devel. Cult. Change 41(1):147￿ 174.
Fafchamps, Marcel. 1999. ￿Risk Sharing and Quasi-Credit.￿Journal of International Trade and
Economic Development 8(3):257￿ 278.
Fafchamps, Marcel. 2003. Rural Poverty, Risk and Development. Cheltenham (UK): Edward
Elgar Publishing.
Fafchamps, Marcel. 2004. Market Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press.
Fafchamps, Marcel. 2005. ￿Development and Social Capital.￿Journal of Development Studies .
(forthcoming).
Fafchamps, Marcel & Bart Minten. 1999. ￿Relationships and Traders in Madagascar.￿Journal
of Development Studies 35(6):1￿ 35.
29Fafchamps, Marcel & Bart Minten. 2002. ￿Returns to Social Network Capital Among Traders.￿
Oxford Economic Papers 54:173￿ 206.
Fafchamps, Marcel & Flore Gubert. 2002. ￿Contingent Loan Repayment in the Philippines.￿
(mimeograph).
Fafchamps, Marcel, Sanjeev Goyal & Marco van der Leij. 2005. ￿Scienti￿c Networks and Coau-
thorship.￿(mimeograph).
Fafchamps, Marcel & Susan Lund. 2003. ￿Risk Sharing Networks in Rural Philippines.￿Journal
of Development Economics 71:261￿ 87.
Fisman, Raymond. 2003. ￿Ethnic Ties and the Provision of Credit: Relationship-Level Evidence
from African Firms.￿Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy 3(1) Article 4.
Foster, Andrew D. & Mark R. Rosenzweig. 1995. ￿Learning by Doing and Learning from Oth-
ers: Human Capital and Technical Change in Agriculture.￿Journal of Political Economy
103(6):1176￿ 1209.
Foster, Andrew D. & Mark R. Rosenzweig. 2001. ￿Imperfect Commitment, Altruism and the
Family: Evidence from Transfer Behavior in Low-Income Rural Areas.￿ Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics 83(3):389￿ 407.
Frankenberg, Elizabeth, James P. Smith & Duncan Thomas. 2003. ￿Economic Shocks, Wealth,
and Welfare.￿Journal of Human Resources 38(2):230￿ 321.
Genicot, Garance & Debraj Ray. 2003. ￿Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements.￿
Review of Economic Studies 70(1):87￿ 113.
30Glewwe, Paul & G. Hall. 1998. ￿Are Some Groups More Vulnerable to Macroeconomic Shocks
than Others? Hypothesis Tests Based on Panel Data from Peru.￿Journal of Development
Economics 56(1):181￿ 206.
Good, P. 2000. Permutation Tests: A Practical Guide to Resampling Methods for Testing
Hypotheses. Springer.
Goyal, Sanjeev, Marco van der Leij & Jose Luis Moraga-Gonzalez. 2004. ￿Economics: An
Emerging Small World?￿ (mimeograph).
Granovetter, M. 1985. ￿Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness.￿
Amer. J. Sociology 91(3):481￿ 510.
Granovetter, Mark S. 1995. Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and Carreers. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press. 2nd edition.
Hubert, L.J. & J. Schultz. 1976. ￿Quadratic Assignment as a General Data Analysis Strategy.￿
British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology 29:190￿ 241.
Johnson, Simon, John McMillan & Christopher Woodru⁄. 2002. ￿Courts and Relational Con-
tracts.￿Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 18(1):221￿ 77.
Krackhardt, David. 1987. ￿QAP Partialling as a Test of Spuriousness.￿Social Networks 9:171￿
86.
Kranton, Rachel & Deborah Minehart. 2001. ￿A Theory of Buyer-Seller Networks.￿American
Economic Review 91(3):485￿ 508.
Krishnan, Pramila & Emanuela Sciubba. 2004. Endogenous Network Formation and Informal
Institutions in Village Economies. Technical report Cambridge Working Paper in Economics
No. 462 Cambridge: .
31Lauby, J. & O. Stark. 1988. ￿Individual Migration as a Family Strategy: Young Women in the
Philippines.￿Population Studies 42:473￿ 86.
Ligon, Ethan, Jonathan P. Thomas & Tim Worrall. 2000. ￿Mutual Insurance, Individual Savings,
and Limited Commitment.￿Review of Economic Dynamics 3(2):216￿ 246.
Ligon, Ethan, Jonathan P. Thomas & Tim Worrall. 2001. ￿Informal Insurance Arrangements
in Village Economies.￿Review of Economic Studies 69(1):209￿ 44.
Lucas, Robert E.B. & Oded Stark. 1985. ￿Motivations to Remit: Evidence from Botswana.￿J.
Polit. Econ. 93 (5):901￿ 918.
Lund, Susan. 1996. ￿Informal Credit and Risk-Sharing Networks in the Rural Philippines.￿
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis).
Meillassoux, Claude. 1971. The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Milgram, B. Lynne. 1999. Crafts, Cultivation, and Household Economies: Women￿ s Work and
Positions in Ifugao, Norther Philippines. In Research in Economic Anthropology. Vol. 20
Stamford, Conn.: Barry L. Isaac (ed.), JAI Press pp. 221￿ 61.
Mitchell, J. Clyde. 1969. Social Networks in Urban Situations: Analyses of Personal Relation-
ships in Central African Towns. Manchester: Manchester U. P.
Mogues, Tewodaj & Michael R. Carter. 2005. ￿Social Capital and the Reproduction of Inequality
in Socially Polarized Economies.￿Journal of Economic Inequality .
Nyblom, Jukka, Steve Borgatti, Juha Roslakka & Mikko A. Salo. 2003. ￿Statistical Analysis of
Network Data ￿An Application to Di⁄usion of Innovation.￿Social Networks 25:175￿ 95.
32Platteau, Jean-Philippe. 1995a. ￿A Framework for the Analysis of Evolving Patron-Client Ties
in Agrarian Economies.￿World Development 23(5):767￿ 786.
Platteau, Jean-Philippe. 1995b. ￿An Indian Model of Aristocratic Patronage.￿ Oxford Econ.
Papers 47(4):636￿ 662.
Quisumbing, Agnes R. 1994. ￿Intergenerational Transfers in Philippine Rice Villages: Gen-
der Di⁄erences in Traditional Inheritance Customs.￿Journal of Development Economics
43(2):167￿ 195.
Raub, Werner & Jeroen Weesie. 1990. ￿Reputation and E¢ ciency in Social Interactions: An
Example of Network E⁄ects.￿Amer. J. Sociology 96(3):626￿ 54.
Romani, Mattia. 2003. ￿Love Thy Neighbour? Evidence from Ethnic Discrimination in Informa-
tion Sharing within Villages in Cote d￿ Ivoire.￿Journal of African Economies 12(4):533￿ 63.
Rosenzweig, M. R. & O. Stark. 1989. ￿Consumption Smoothing, Migration, and Marriage:
Evidence from Rural India.￿Journal of Political Economy 97(4):905￿ 26.
Rosenzweig, Mark R. & Kenneth Wolpin. 1988. ￿Migration Selectivity and the E⁄ect of Public
Programs.￿J. Public Econ. 37:470￿ 482.
Russell, Susan. 1987. ￿Middlemen and Moneylending: Relations of Exchange in a Highland
Philippine Economy.￿Journal of Anthropological Research 43:139￿ 61.
Shapiro, K. 1979. Livestock Production and Marketing in the Entente States of West Africa:
Summary Report. University of Michigan.
Smith, R. & Richard Blundell. 1986. ￿An Exogeneity Test for a Simultaneous Equation Tobit
Model with an Application to Labor Supply.￿Econometrica 54:679￿ 685.
33Townsend, Robert M. 1994. ￿Risk and Insurance in Village India.￿Econometrica 62(3):539￿ 591.
Udry, Christopher. 1994. ￿Risk and Insurance in a Rural Credit Market: An Empirical Investi-
gation in Northern Nigeria.￿Rev. Econ. Stud. 61(3):495￿ 526.
Vega-Redondo, Fernando. 2004. ￿Di⁄usion, Search, and Play in Complex Social Networks.￿
(mimeograph).
Weesie, Jeroen & Werner Raub. 2000. The Management of Durable Relations. Thela Thesis.
Wooldridge, Je⁄rey M. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
34Table 1. Characteristics of insurance partners
A. Relationship to household head
Close relative (*) 488 52.0%
Distant relative (**) 316 33.7%
Neighbor 104 11.1%
Friend 27 2.9%
Other (store owner, etc.) 4 0.4%
B. Residence
Same barangay (village) 596 63.5%
Another barangay (village) in same district 151 16.1%
Elsewhere in the province 44 4.7%
Elsewhere in the Cordillera Administrative Region 35 3.7%
Elsewnere in the lowlands 58 6.2%
In Manila 12 1.3%
Abroad 14 1.5%
Unknown 29 3.1%
Total 939 100.0%
(*) son/daughter, son/daughter in law, grandchild, father/mother and brother/sister.
(**) nephew/niece, cousin, and aunt/uncle.Table 2. Definition and mean values of variables used in regressions
Mean St. Dev.
Household characteristics (n=206)
Location Walking distance to the road in minutes 17.5 15.8
Sex of head 0=male, 1=female 7%
Education of head in years of completed education 3.9 3.4
Age of head 45.1 11.8
Health index  1=healthy, 2=frequently ill, 3=chronic illness, 4=disabled 1.403 0.8
Land inheritance =1 if head inherited a ricefield 74%
Value of the inheritance of the head in 100,000 pesos 0.355 0.5
Value of the inheritance of the spouse in 100,000 pesos 0.304 0.5
Number of children in head's family of origin 4.8 2.5
Number of children in spouse's family of origin 4.9 2.7
Birth order of household head 2.1 1.8
Head never moved =1 if born in village 67%
Occupation
Occupation of head =1 if primary occupation of head is farming 65%
Number of members in agriculture or livestock 1.97 0.7
Number of members in casual labor 0.88 0.9
Number of members in wood carving 0.42 0.7
Number of members in carpet and basket weaving 0.22 0.5
Number of members in other self-employment activities 0.19 0.5
Number of members in salaried employment 0.23 0.5
Number of working members (*) 2.58 1.1
Total wealth Value of fields, house, livestock and durable goods in 100,000 pesos 0.846 1.1
Total income Earnings from jobs, crop or livestock sales and miscellenous incomes 
(rents, pensions, mortage payments, etc.) in 100,000 pesos
0.189 0.3
Shock variables
Shock index in round 1 -2=Much better than 3 months ago, +2=much worse than 3 months ago -0.752 0.6
Shock index in round 2 0.301 0.7
Shock index in round 3 -0.063 0.7
Acute sickness in round 1 =1 if at leat one member was acutely sick in last three months 26%
Acute sickness in round 2 20%
Acute sickness in round 3 16%
Mild sickness in round 1 =1 if at leat one member was mildly sick in last three months 44%
Mild sickness in round 2 38%
Mild sickness in round 3 29%
Unemployment in round1 =1 if at leat one member became unemployed in last three months 23%
Unemployment in round2 20%
Unemployment in round3 8%
Incurred ritual expense in round 1 =1 if the household incurred ritual expense in last three months 7%
Incurred ritual expense in round 2 10%
Incurred ritual expense in round 3 3%
Village dummies
village1 =1 if household resides in village 1 26%
village2 =1 if household resides in village 2 29%
village3 =1 if household resides in village 3 25%
village4 =1 if household resides in village 4 20%
Attributes of link (n=10,592)
Network link =1 if respondent has cited j as a source of mutual insurance, 0 otherwise  2%
Same sitio =1 if i and j reside in same sitio 41%
Geographical proximity Difference in travel time (minutes) to road if i and j reside in same sitio 3.77 9.3
Correlation of i's and j's incomes 0.140 0.7
(*) The total of working member is less than the sum of members working in various activities because of double occupation.Table 3. Regression results
coefficient dyadic coefficient dyadic coefficient dyadic
Geographical proximity estimate t-value estimate t-value estimate t-value
Same sitio =1 2.668 8.93 2.662 8.94 2.400 5.03
Difference in distance to road if same sitio -0.125 -4.13 -0.126 -4.15 -0.119 -2.13
Difference in:
Dummy=1 if primary occupation of head is farming 0.000 0.00 -0.004 -0.03 0.087 0.48
Number of working members  0.025 0.43 0.023 0.32 0.074 0.79
Age of household head -0.010 -2.72 -0.010 -2.78 -0.009 -1.64
Health index 1-4 (1=good health, 4=disabled) 0.035 0.60 0.035 0.69 0.050 0.79
Years of education of household head -0.012 -0.66 -0.012 -0.72 -0.007 -0.24
Total wealth (predicted) -0.125 -2.62 -0.125 -2.56 -0.209 -2.49
Sum of:
Dummy=1 if primary occupation of head is farming 0.013 0.11 0.107 0.50
Number of working members  -0.157 -2.56 -0.137 -1.55
Age of household head 0.002 0.33 0.010 0.99
Health index 1-4 (1=good health, 4=disabled) 0.102 1.24 0.179 1.20
Years of education of household head 0.005 0.26 0.037 0.96
Total wealth (predicted) 0.014 0.15 0.030 0.18
Village dummies:
Mills ratio -0.116 -0.10
intercept -5.828 -16.93 -5.538 -8.37 -6.664 -5.01
Number of observations 10592 10592 4788
Note: the dependent variable=1 if i cites j as source of mutual insurance, 0 otherwise
Estimator is logit. All t-values based on standard errors corrected for dyadic correlation of errors.
included but not shownTable 4. With a more detailed breakdown of income earning activities
coefficient dyadic coefficient dyadic
Geographical proximity estimate t-value estimate t-value
Same sitio =1 2.669 8.93 2.676 8.99
Difference in distance to road if same sitio -0.125 -4.13 -0.128 -4.20
Difference in:
Nber of members in agriculture or livestock -0.118 -1.32 -0.127 -1.38
Nber of members in casual labor -0.002 -0.05 -0.009 -0.16
Nber of members in wood carving 0.064 0.68 0.055 0.60
Nber of members in carpet and basket weaving -0.135 -0.97 -0.123 -0.92
Nber of members in other self-employed activity -0.117 -1.05 -0.145 -1.12
Nber of members in salaried employment -0.071 -0.49 -0.076 -0.50
Years of education of household head -0.008 -0.50 -0.010 -0.65
Age of household head -0.009 -2.44 -0.009 -2.48
Health index 1-4 (1=good health, 4=disabled) 0.027 0.48 0.026 0.55
Number of working members  0.062 0.76 0.062 0.71
Total wealth (predicted) -0.110 -2.15 -0.109 -2.23
Sum of:
Nber of members in agriculture or livestock -0.123 -1.53
Nber of members in casual labor -0.086 -0.96
Nber of members in wood carving 0.036 0.29
Nber of members in carpet and basket weaving 0.067 0.46
Nber of members in other self-employed activity -0.114 -0.90
Nber of members in salaried employment -0.004 -0.03
Years of education of household head -0.002 -0.10
Age of household head 0.003 0.43
Health index 1-4 (1=good health, 4=disabled) 0.093 1.12
Number of working members  -0.111 -1.29
Total wealth (predicted) 0.024 0.24
Village dummies:
intercept -5.857 -16.45 -5.214 -6.50
Number of observations 10592 10592
Note: the dependent variable=1 if i cites j as source of mutual insurance, 0 otherwise
Estimator is logit. All t-values based on standard errors corrected for dyadic correlation of errors.
included but not shownTable 5. With income correlation, mean, and standard deviation
coefficient dyadic coefficient dyadic
Geographical proximity estimate t-value estimate t-value
Same sitio =1 2.647 8.84 2.655 8.84
Difference in distance to road if same sitio -0.121 -3.90 -0.121 -3.92
Incomes variables (instrumented)
Correlation of i and j's incomes 1.083 1.44 1.370 1.41
Sum of i and j's mean incomes 0.216 0.21
Difference in i and j's mean incomes 0.734 0.76
Sum of i and j's income standard deviation -7.365 -2.52
Difference in i and j's income standard deviation -9.086 -2.31
Difference in:
Dummy=1 if primary occupation of head is farming 0.028 0.23 0.088 0.76
Number of working members  0.003 0.06 -0.059 -0.95
Age of household head -0.010 -2.52 -0.009 -2.24
Health index 1-4 (1=good health, 4=disabled) 0.027 0.46 -0.057 -0.91
Years of education of household head -0.010 -0.59 0.007 0.31
Total wealth (predicted) -0.113 -2.37 0.024 0.29
Village dummies:
Intercept -5.995 -15.41 -5.464 -10.71
Number of observations 10264 10264
Note: the dependent variable=1 if i cites j as source of mutual insurance, 0 otherwise
Estimator is logit. All t-values based on standard errors corrected for dyadic correlation of errors.
included but not shownTable 6. Gifts, loans and networks
Gifts received (*) Loans received (*)
coefficient dyadic coefficient dyadic
Geographical proximity estimate t-value estimate t-value
Same sitio =1 0.052 6.51 0.037 4.17
Difference in distance to road if same sitio -0.002 -5.27 -0.001 -2.55
Network dummy x difference in:
Dummy=1 if primary occupation of head is farming -0.234 -1.25 -0.255 -2.32
Number of working members  -0.080 -0.72 -0.003 -0.07
Age of household head 0.005 0.61 0.001 0.18
Health index 1-4 (1=good health, 4=disabled) 0.281 2.62 0.011 0.13
Years of education of household head -0.018 -0.66 -0.009 -0.47
Total wealth (predicted) -0.034 -0.28 0.019 0.26
Difference in:
Dummy=1 if primary occupation of head is farming 0.001 0.51 -0.009 -2.36
Number of working members  0.000 1.38 0.002 1.08
Age of household head 0.000 -0.44 0.000 -0.52
Health index 1-4 (1=good health, 4=disabled) 0.001 2.04 0.000 -0.22
Years of education of household head 0.000 -0.80 0.000 -0.74
Total wealth (predicted) 0.000 0.49 -0.002 -0.71
Sum of:
Dummy=1 if primary occupation of head is farming 0.003 0.99 -0.002 -0.50
Number of working members x number of activities -0.003 -1.52 0.000 0.13
Age of household head 0.000 1.13 0.000 -0.76
Health index 1-4 (1=good health, 4=disabled) 0.003 1.15 0.001 0.64
Years of education of household head 0.000 0.35 0.001 2.20
Total wealth (predicted) 0.001 0.63 -0.001 -0.39
Village x time dummies
Intercept -0.015 -0.83 -0.006 -0.28
Number of observations 21184 21184
Estimator is least squares. All t-values based on standard errors corrected for dyadic correlation of errors.
(*) Dependent variable in log(value of gift or loan +1)
included but not shownTable 7. The insurance role of gifts and loans between villagers
Gifts received (*) Loans received (*)
coefficient dyadic coefficient dyadic
Insurance estimate t-value estimate t-value
Difference in current status (predicted) 0.000 -0.03 0.009 1.10
Network dummy x difference in current status 0.613 1.71 0.126 0.41
Network dummy 0.996 10.54 0.370 4.88
Geographical proximity
Same sitio =1 0.010 2.54 0.022 2.95
Difference in distance to road if same sitio -0.001 -3.20 -0.001 -1.63
Difference in:
Dummy=1 if primary occupation of head is farming -0.003 -0.60 -0.014 -3.23
Number of working members  -0.002 -1.06 0.001 0.79
Age of household head 0.000 1.51 0.000 0.23
Health index 1-4 (1=good health, 4=disabled) 0.006 2.41 -0.001 -0.30
Years of education of household head 0.000 -0.50 0.000 -0.65
Total wealth (predicted) 0.002 0.91 -0.001 -0.27
Village x time dummies
intercept -0.002 -0.43 -0.006 -1.47
Number of observations 21184 21184
Estimator is least squares. All t-values based on standard errors corrected for dyadic correlation of errors.
(*) Dependent variable in log(value of gift or loan +1)
included but not shownTable A1. Instrumenting wealth
Sum of wealth Wealth difference
coefficient dyadic coefficient dyadic
estimate t-value estimate t-value
Regressors
Dummy=1 if born in village 0.080 0.92 0.080 0.89
Dummy=1 if head is male, 2 if female -0.305 -1.94 -0.305 -1.87
Education of household head 0.034 1.89 0.034 1.82
Number of siblings of household head -0.009 -0.46 -0.008 -0.44
Number of siblings of spouse -0.008 -0.62 -0.008 -0.60
Value of inherited land of head 0.940 6.99 0.941 6.74
Value of inherited land of spouse 1.028 5.09 1.028 4.92
Village dummies
Intercept 1.019 1.94 n.a.
Number of observations 10592 10592
Estimator is least squares. All t-values based on standard errors corrected for dyadic correlation of errors.
(*) Dependent variable in log(value of gift or loan +1)
all regressors as diff. all regressors as sums
included but not shownTable A2. Migration selection regression
coefficient dyadic
Sum of: estimate t-value
Birth order of household head -0.118 -1.83
Dummy=1 if male head, 2 if female -0.165 -0.75
Education of household head -0.055 -1.91
Age of household head -0.003 -0.43
Village dummies
intercept 1.561 1.59
Number of observations 10592
Dependent variable=1 if both household heads reside in birth village
Estimator is logit. 
All t-values based on standard errors corrected for dyadic correlation of errors.
includedTable A3. Instrumenting regressions for income correlation, mean and standard deviation
coefficient dyadic coefficient dyadic coefficient dyadic coefficient dyadic coefficient dyadic
Geographical proximity estimate t-value estimate t-value estimate t-value estimate t-value estimate t-value
Same sitio =1 -0.014 -0.59 -0.001 -0.07 -0.007 -0.99
Difference in distance to road if same sitio -0.002 -0.97 -0.001 -1.64 0.000 -0.41
Sum of:
Nber of members in agriculture or livestock 0.021 0.97 -0.048 -0.83 0.011 1.31
Nber of members in casual labor 0.005 0.26 -0.025 -0.81 0.004 0.89
Nber of members in wood carving 0.041 1.17 -0.013 -0.32 0.000 0.07
Nber of members in carpet and basket weaving 0.045 1.06 0.023 0.45 0.027 1.47
Nber of members in other self-employed activity 0.003 0.14 -0.039 -1.34 0.005 0.41
Nber of members in salaried employment 0.071 1.43 -0.091 -2.25 0.003 0.19
Number of working members  -0.072 -3.62 0.073 1.83 -0.010 -1.72
Total wealth 0.010 0.43 0.067 3.15 0.024 1.43
Years of education of household head 0.003 0.59 -0.002 -0.35 0.001 0.29
Health index 1-4 (1=good health, 4=disabled) 0.035 1.64 -0.024 -1.24 -0.011 -1.93
Difference in:
Nber of members in agriculture or livestock 0.066 2.97 -0.045 -0.74 0.012 1.29
Nber of members in casual labor -0.026 -1.29 -0.023 -0.75 0.004 0.81
Nber of members in wood carving 0.005 0.15 -0.012 -0.30 0.000 -0.01
Nber of members in carpet and basket weaving 0.016 0.49 0.096 1.19 0.043 1.78
Nber of members in other self-employed activity 0.018 3.68 -0.088 -1.61 -0.006 -0.31
Nber of members in salaried employment 0.010 0.59 -0.153 -2.09 -0.014 -0.68
Number of working members  -0.014 -0.87 0.058 1.74 -0.011 -1.58
Total wealth -0.029 -1.14 0.079 3.26 0.027 1.47
Years of education of household head 0.009 2.31 0.020 0.89 0.006 1.09
Health index 1-4 (1=good health, 4=disabled) 0.002 0.26 -0.022 -1.26 -0.012 -1.93
Village dummies
intercept -0.189 -1.32 0.465 1.23 0.081 2.20
Number of observations 10264 10486 10486 10592 10592
Estimator is least squares. All t-values based on standard errors corrected for dyadic correlation of errors.
Difference in
income  mean income income std. dev. mean income income std. dev.
Correlation of Sum of   Sum of   Difference in
included but not shown
absolute difference difference   difference  Table A4. Instrumenting regression for shock index
coefficient dyadic
Difference in: estimate t-value
Dummy=1 if acute sickness  0.415 3.62
Dummy=1 if mild sickness 0.205 2.84
Dummy=1 if one household member unemployed 0.219 2.22
Dummy=1 if incurred ritual expense 0.562 4.13
Number of observations 21184
Dependent variable is difference in shock index between i and j 
Estimator is least squares. 
All t-values based on standard errors corrected for dyadic correlation of errors.